Incompatibilism is the view that free will is incompatible with determinism. Combatibilism is the view that free will is compatible with determinism. The debate between the two positions is seemingly intractable. However, just as elsewhere in philosophy, leveraging assumptions about value can offer progress. A promising value argument against incompatibilism is as follows: given facts about both human psychology and the value of free will, incompatibilism is false. This is because we would want our choices to be free but we (...) also would not want indeterminism anywhere in the process leading up to our choices. Hence freedom can’t require a lack of determinism. (shrink)

This paper presents a preliminary analysis of homeopathy from the perspective of the demarcation problem in the philosophy of science. In this context, Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend’s solution to the problem will be given respectively and their criteria will be applied to homeopathy, aiming to shed some light on the controversy over its scientific status. It then examines homeopathy under the lens of demarcation criteria to conclude that homeopathy is regarded as science by Feyerabend and is considered as pseudoscience by (...) Popper and Kuhn. By offering adequate tools for the analysis of the foundations, structure and implications of homeopathy, demarcation issue can help to clarify this medical controversy. The main argument of this article is that a final decision on homeopathy, whose scientific status changes depending on the criteria of the philosophers mentioned, cannot be given. (shrink)

Diogenes of Sinope, bilinen adıyla Diogenes ya da Sinoplu Diyojen’e yönelik yapılan bu çalışmada amacım, Dioegenes’in yaşamının, felsefi duruşunun ve benimsediği etik kuralların kapsamlı ve belgelenmiş bir şekilde sunulmasıdır. Diogenes’in hayatını ve öğretilerini güvenilir bir şekilde aktarmak aşırı derecede zordur, çünkü diğer antik filozoflardan ayrı olarak, onun yaşamına ilişkin güvenilir kaynaklar bulmak oldukça sınırlıdır. Ayrıca, fıçının içinde yaşayan bir Kinikli’ye yönelik ortaya konulmuş birçok kurmaca anekdot ile uğraşılması gerekmektedir. Güvenilir bilginin azlığı ve belgesiz atıfların yarattığı zorluklara rağmen, yine de birçok (...) kişinin hayalinde hayatta kalmayı başaran ünlü filozofun portresini ölümünden yirmi üç yüzyıl sonra yeniden inşa etmek mümkün gözükmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Diogenes’in yaşam tarzı ve felsefesine yönelik bilgiler verilecek, ardından temsil ettiği akım olan kinizmin temel öğretileri çeşitli kaynaklardan gösterilerek aktarılacaktır. Son olarak da, Diogenes’in Sinop kültürünün ve kültürel mirasımızın bir parçası olarak kabul edilmesinin mümkün olup olmadığı tartışılacaktır. (shrink)

We are all guilty of it. We call people terrible names in conversation or online. We vilify those with whom we disagree, and make bolder claims than we could defend. We want to be seen as taking the moral high ground not just to make a point, or move a debate forward, but to look a certain way--incensed, or compassionate, or committed to a cause. We exaggerate. In other words, we grandstand. Nowhere is this more evident than in public discourse (...) today, and especially as it plays out across the internet. To philosophers Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke, who have written extensively about moral grandstanding, such one-upmanship is not just annoying, but dangerous. As politics gets more and more polarized, people on both sides of the spectrum move further and further apart when they let grandstanding get in the way of engaging one another. The pollution of our most urgent conversations with self-interest damages the very causes they are meant to forward. Drawing from work in psychology, economics, and political science, and along with contemporary examples spanning the political spectrum, the authors dive deeply into why and how we grandstand. Using the analytic tools of psychology and moral philosophy, they explain what drives us to behave in this way, and what we stand to lose by taking it too far. Most importantly, they show how, by avoiding grandstanding, we can re-build a public square worth participating in. (shrink)

I articulate the challenge disagreement poses for epistemic contextualism, and then discuss several possible replies on behalf of the contextualist.

Thomas Kuhn’un 1962 yılında yayımlamış olduğu “Bilimsel Devrimlerin Yapısı” adlı kitabı bilimsel gelişme, bilimin doğası ve bilimsel bilginin özerkliği gibi çeşitli bilim felsefesi konularında alanında rölativist ya da göreci bir anlayışa katkıda bulunarak bilimin sarsılmaz statüsüne zarar verip vermediğine yöneliktir. Kuhn’un rölativistlikle suçlanmasına yol açan argümanlardan ön plana çıkan ikisi; iki farklı rakip paradigmaya bağlı olan kuramların kıyaslanmasının mümkün olmadığını ileri süren metodolojik eşölçülemezlik argümanı ile kuramdan bağımsız nötr gözlem önermelerinin olamayacağını belirten gözlemlerin kuram yüklü olduğu savıdır. Kuhn bu argümanlar (...) çerçevesinde kendisine getirilen görecilik iddialarına karşı çıkar ve bilim felsefecilerinin ona yöneltmiş olduğu eleştirilere yıllar içerisinde “Bilimsel Devrimlerin Yapısı” kitabının ek bölümlerinde cevap vermektedir. Bu bağlamda, Kuhn’un bu iddialara ikna edici bir cevap verip vermediğini tespit edebilmek ve onun gerçekten bilim ve bilimsel bilginin statüsü konusunda rölativist olup olmadığını soruşturmak için ortaya konulan eleştirilerin etraflıca ele alınması gerekliliği ortaya çıkmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, Kuhn'un görecilik konusu ile ilgili bir neticeye varabilmek amacıyla onun bütün bilim anlayışının göz önünde bulundurulması önemlidir. Dolayısıyla Kuhn'un genel bilim tasviri bu çalışmanın odağını oluşturmaktadır. Bu bakımdan çalışmada, ilk olarak kısaca “göreciliğin” ne anlama geldiği ortaya konulacak, ardından Kuhn’un eşölçülemezlik ve kuram yüklülük tezleri ayrıntılandırılarak, bu çerçeve içerisinde neden rölativist olarak kabul edildiği serimlenecektir. Nihai olarak, Kuhn'un kendisine getirilen eleştirilere karşı ortaya koyduğu cevapların rölativist suçlamalardan sıyrılması için sağlam gerekçeleri sağlayamadığı ortaya konulacaktır. (shrink)

One problem for Molinism that critics of the view have pressed, and which Molinists have so far done little to address, is that even if there are true counterfactuals of freedom, it is puzzling how God could possibly know them. I defuse this worry by sketching a plausible model of the mechanics of middle knowledge which draws on William Alston’s direct acquaintance account of divine knowledge.

Epistemicists claim that vague predicates have precise but unknow- able cutoffs. I argue against against the standard, Williamsonian, answer, that appeals to metalinguistic safety: we can know that p even if our true belief that p is metalinguistically lucky. I then propose that epistemicists should be diagonalized epistemicists and show how this alternative formulation of the view avoids the chal- lenge. However, in an M. Night Shyamalan-style twist, I then argue we should not be diagonalized epistemicists either.

The question of where the knowledge comes from when we conduct thought experiments has been one of the most fundamental issues discussed in the epistemological position of thought experiments. In this regard, Pierre Duhem shows a skeptical attitude on the subject by stating that thought experiments cannot be evaluated as real experiments or cannot be accepted as an alternative to real experiments. James R. Brown, on the other hand, states that thought experiments, which are not based on new experimental evidence (...) or logically derived from old data, called the Platonic thought experiment, provide intuitive access to a priori knowledge. Unlike Brown, John D. Norton strictly criticizes the idea that thought experiments provide mysterious access to the knowledge of the physical world, and states that thought experiments cannot provide knowledge that transcends empiricism. In the context of the NortonBrown debate, in this article, Brown's stance on thought experiments is supported by critically analyzing the thoughts put forward on the subject. -/- Düşünce deneylerini gerçekleştirdiğimizde sonucunda elde edilen bilginin nereden geldiği sorusu düşünce deneylerinin epistemolojik konumuna ilişkin tartışılan en temel konulardan bir tanesidir. Bu doğrultuda, Pierre Duhem düşünce deneylerinin gerçek deneyler ile aynı statüde değerlendirilemeyeceğini ve hatta düşünce deneylerinin gerçek deneylerin bir alternatifi olarak bile kabul edilemeyeceğini belirterek konuya ilişkin şüpheci bir tavır sergilemektedir. James R. Brown ise yeni deneysel kanıtlara dayanmayan ya da eski verilerden mantıksal olarak türetilmeyen, Platoncu düşünce deneyi olarak adlandırılan düşünce deneylerinin a priori bilgiye sezgisel erişim sağladığını ifade etmektedir. Brown’ın aksine, John D. Norton düşünce deneylerinin fiziksel dünyanın bilgisine gizemli bir erişim sağladığı yönündeki düşünceyi kesin bir dille eleştirmekte ve düşünce deneylerinin ampirizmi aşan bir bilgi sağlamasının mümkün olamayacağını ifade etmektedir. Norton-Brown tartışması çerçevesinde bu makalede, Brown'un düşünce deneylerine ilişkin tutumu, konuyla ilgili düşüncelerin eleştirel olarak analiz edilmesiyle desteklenmektedir. (shrink)

Margaret MacDonald (1907–56) was a central figure in the history of early analytic philosophy in Britain due to both her editorial work as well as her own writings. While her later work on aesthetics and political philosophy has recently received attention, her early writings in the 1930s present a coherent and, for its time, strikingly original blend of common-sense and scientific philosophy. In these papers, MacDonald tackles the central problems of philosophy of her day: verification, the problem of induction, and (...) the relationship between philosophical and scientific method. MacDonald’s philosophy of science starts from the principle that we should carefully analyse the elements of scientific practice (particularly its temporal features) and the ways that scientists describe that practice. That is, she applies the techniques of ordinary language philosophy to actual scientific language. MacDonald shows how ‘scientific common-sense’ is inconsistent with both of the dominant schools of philosophy of her day. Bringing MacDonald back into the story of analytic philosophy corrects the impression that in early analytic philosophy, there are fundamental dichotomies between the style of Moore and Wittgenstein, on the one hand, and the Vienna Circle on the other. (shrink)

It is widely agreed that the intelligibility of modal metaphysics has been vindicated. Quine's arguments to the contrary supposedly confused analyticity with metaphysical necessity, and rigid with non-rigid designators.2 But even if modal metaphysics is intelligible, it could be misconceived. It could be that metaphysical necessity is not absolute necessity – the strictest real notion of necessity – and that no proposition of traditional metaphysical interest is necessary in every real sense. If there were nothing otherwise “uniquely metaphysically significant” about (...) metaphysical necessity, then paradigmatic metaphysical necessities would be necessary in one sense of “necessary”, not necessary in another, and that would be it. The question of whether they were necessary simpliciter would be like the question of whether the Parallel Postulate is true simpliciter – understood as a pure mathematical conjecture, rather than as a hypothesis about physical spacetime. In a sense, the latter question has no objective answer. In this article, I argue that paradigmatic questions of modal metaphysics are like the Parallel Postulate question. I then discuss the deflationary ramifications of this argument. I conclude with an alternative conception of the space of possibility. According to this conception, there is no objective boundary between possibility and impossibility. Along the way, I sketch an analogy between modal metaphysics and set theory. (shrink)

It is the contention of this paper that ethics of work ought to be anthropological, and artificial intelligence (AI) research and development, which is the focus of work today, should be anthropological, that is, human-centered. This paper discusses the philosophical and theological implications of the development of AI research on the intrinsic nature of work and the nature of the human person. AI research and the implications of its development and advancement, being a relatively new phenomenon, have not been comprehensively (...) interrogated in the social and ethical teachings of the Catholic Church. This paper, therefore, proposes a path for this interrogation by expounding a discourse which is believed to be epistemically helpful in the developing discourse of AI in the ethical and social teachings of the Church. The advancement in the research on AI is not only redefining the meaning of work, but, even more so, it is questioning the metaphysical notion of the human person and the theological notion of work as an intrinsic part in the selfhood and dignity of the human person. (shrink)

Hermeneutik tarihsel süreç içerisinde hukuk, teoloji, tarih, sanat ve felsefe gibi çeşitli alanlarda farklı şekillerde tanımlanmış ve kullanılmış bir kavramdır. Bu doğrultuda, hermeneutiğin tam olarak belirlenebilmesi amacıyla, hermeneutik kelimesinin kökenine ve bu disiplinin tarihine mümkün olduğunca öz bir şekilde bakma gereksinimi ortaya çıkmaktadır. Çünkü hermeneutik disiplinini tek bir perspektiften değerlendirmek, onun temel gerçekliğini anlamamıza engel olacak çarpıtmaların gün yüzüne çıkmasına sebep olabilir. Genel anlamda bir ifadenin, anlamın, metnin ya da sanat eserinin belirli bir çerçeve içerisinde yorumlanması olarak değerlendirilen hermeneutik, felsefe (...) açısından varlığın oluş tarzı, sosyoloji açısından metodolojik problemlere yönelik bir çözüm, dini açıdan ise anlaşılması güç metinlerin anlamını gün yüzüne çıkaran yorum kuralları bütünü olarak tanımlanabilir (Audi, 1999: 377). Webster’in Uluslararası İngilizce sözlüğünde hermeneutik kavramı genel ifadesiyle yorumlama ve açıklamanın metodolojik ilkelerinin soruşturulması olarak tanımlanmakta iken, daha özel anlamda ise İncil’in çevirisinin yapılabilmesi için belirlenen genel prensiplerin incelenmesi olarak belirtilmiştir (Gove, 1971: 1059). Bu çalışmada, Auguste Comte’un öncülük ettiği pozitivist anlayışın öne sürdüğü ve desteklediği doğa bilimci yöntemin ve pozitivist tarih anlayışının, insanı ve yaşantısını doğru bir kavrayışla değerlendirme noktasında etkili olamadığı vurgulanacaktır. Pozitivist düşünce doğa bilimlerinin elde etmiş olduğu başarı ve kazanımlardan yola çıkarak dönemin bilim anlayışı konusunda belirleyici olmakla birlikte, ön plana çıkardığı bilimsellik modelinin ya da kriterinin bir sonucu olarak tinsel bilimlerin ya da beşerî bilimlerin doğasına uygun olmayan yöntemleri benimsemesi hususunda belirleyici bir unsur olmuştur. Böylece, doğa bilimleri söz sahibi olmadığı bir alan içerisinde parlatılarak, bilimsellik statüsü kazanabilme kaygısıyla tinsel bilimleri yöntemsel bir kriz içerisine sürüklemiştir. Bu çerçevede, hermeneutiğin zaman içerisindeki dönüşümünün zirve noktasında yer alan düşünürlerden biri olan Wilhelm Dilthey’in tinsel bilimleri yöntemsel açıdan karşı karşıya kaldıkları kriz durumundan çıkarmak amacıyla ileri sürdüğü hermeneutik yönteme ilişkin savlarını, hermeneutiğin tarihsel süreç içerisindeki kazanımlarından yola çıkarak tartışmak gerekmektedir. (shrink)

The objective of this work is to explore the notion of “action” and “agency” in artificial intelligence (AI). It employs a metaphysical notion of action and agency as an epistemological tool in the critique of the notion of “action” and “agency” in artificial intelligence. Hence, both a metaphysical and cognitive analysis is employed in the investigation of the quiddity and nature of action and agency per se, and how they are, by extension employed in the language and science of artificial (...) intelligence. The advent of the science of artificial intelligence and cognitive science, and the technological applications of artificial intelligence in the production of agents such as driverless cars and expert systems, have raised the question of moral, ethical and/or legal responsibility in AI agents. This has re-emphasized the importance of the philosophical discourse on the notions of action and agency, which in contemporary intellectual discourse are now perceived to be phenomena within the epistemic competence of the natural sciences. This paper argues that AI systems do not and cannot possess free agency and autonomy, thus cannot be morally and ethically responsible, hence, it recommends a socio-political response to the question of responsibility in AI. It is then the duty of individual nations, or the global community to define and enact policies on who shoulders the responsibility of actions executed by AIs. (shrink)

Perhaps the most fundamental disagreement concerning Nietzsche's view of metaphysics is that some commentators believe Nietzsche has a positive, systematic metaphysical project, and others deny this. Those who deny it hold that Nietzsche believes metaphysics has a special problem, that is, a distinctively problematic feature that distinguishes metaphysics from other areas of philosophy. In this paper, I investigate important features of Nietzsche's metametaphysics in order to argue that Nietzsche does not, in fact, think metaphysics has a special problem. The result (...) is that, against a long-standing view held in the literature, we should be reading Nietzsche as a metaphysician. (shrink)

Introduction In recent years there has been a welcome reawakening of philosophical interest in the emotions. A significant number of contemporary ...

Both in everyday life and in moral philosophy, many think that our own past wrongdoing can undermine our standing to indignantly blame others for similar wrongdoing. In recent literature on the ethics of blame, we find two different kinds of explanation for this. Relative moral status accounts hold that to have standing to blame, you must be better than the person you are blaming, in terms of compliance with the norm. Fault-based accounts hold that those who blame others for things (...) of which they are also guilty exhibit familiar moral faults, such as making an exception of oneself, and that these faults explain why they lack standing. I argue in support of relative moral status accounts, showing that they both better trace our practice of dismissing blame on the basis of lack of standing, and that they have more explanatory resources than has been appreciated. (shrink)

In this study, the existing definitions of thought experiments and the origin of this concept with its first usage in history will be discussed. Then, the epistemology of Ernst Mach, who conducted the first systematic research on thought experiments, will be provided in order to grasp his views on this subject correctly. In this context, the views of James Brown and John Norton, who support different positions, will be briefly described in order to draw the general framework of the epistemological (...) status of thought experiments. Finally, it will be revealed that the biological theory of knowledge and the doctrine of the economy of thought are the sources of Mach’s ‘instinctive knowledge’ argument about scientific thought experiments. (shrink)

Fen eğitimi ve öğretiminin anahtar unsurlarından bir tanesi bilimin doğasının ve özelliklerinin doğru bir şekilde tespit edilmesidir. Bilimin doğasına yönelik tespitler fen eğitimi yöntemlerini birçok açıdan etkilemektedir. Fen eğitimi ve fen öğretimi ile ilgili olan kişiler bilimin doğasının açık bir şekilde öğretilmesi gerektiğini kabul etmektedir. Thomas Kuhn’un bilim tarihi, bilim felsefesi ve bilim sosyolojisi alanlarını içeren incelemeleri neticesinde ileri sürdüğü bilimin yapısına, işleyişine ve doğasına yönelik tezleri (paradigma, olağan bilim, bilimsel devrimler, eşölçülemezlik, bulmaca çözme, kuram seçimi, keşif ve gerekçelendirme ayrımı) (...) fen eğitimi ve öğretimi alanında sıklıkla başvurulan kaynaklar olmuştur. Bu doğrultuda makalede mantıkçı pozitivist bilim anlayışının bilimin nesnel, evrensel, kesin gerçekleri ortaya çıkaran, sosyal-kültürel değerlerden ve ön yargılardan bağımsız, bilimsel bilginin birikimsel bir şekilde ilerlediği yönündeki iddiası bilimin gerçek doğasını yansıtamadığı düşüncesiyle Kuhn’un görüşleri çerçevesinde tartışılmaktadır. Makalenin temel savı Kuhn’un bilime ve bilimin doğasına yönelik tespitlerinin bilimin gelişen, dönüşen ve değişen yapıdaki gerçek doğasına vurgu yaptığı ve böylece fen eğitiminde sıklıkla başvurulan bilimin doğasına yönelik kavrayışı dönüştürdüğüdür. (shrink)

COMMISSIONER KLAUS VERSEN: Counselors, I want to remind you both of two matters. First, this commission is not bound by the statutes or legal precedents of ...

Gözlemlenenlerden gözlemlen(e)meyenlere diğer bir deyişle genel yasalara ulaşma imkânı veren çıkarım yöntemi olarak tümevarımsal ya da endüktif akıl yürütmenin rasyonel olarak temellendirilmesinin imkanına yönelik soruşturma tarih içerisinde tümevarım sorunu ya da endüksiyon problemi olarak tezahür etmiştir. Bu sorunun temel argümanı tarihsel okumalara baktığımızda İskoç ampirist filozof David Hume tarafından öne sürülmüştür. Hume, tümevarımsal çıkarımlar temelinde, gözlenmeyen meseleler hakkındaki inançlarımıza hangi gerekçelerle ulaştığımızı soruşturmaktadır. Hume soruşturmasının sonucunda gözlemlenenden gözlemlen(e)meyen durumlara ilişkin yapılan olgu meseleleri ile ilgili bütün tümevarımsal akıl yürütmelerin dolaylı ya (...) da dolaysız olarak nedensellik ilişkisine ve bu ilişkinin temelinde yer alan doğanın düzenliliği ilkesi ya da “gelecek her zaman geçmişe benzer” önermesine dayandığını ifade ederek bütün tümevarımsal akıl yürütmelerde ortak olan geleceğin her zaman geçmişe benzeyeceği ifadesinin rasyonel olarak temellendirilmesinin mümkün olmadığını belirtmektedir. Bu bağlamda, çalışmada tümevarımsal akıl yürütme sonucunda ulaşılan sonuca inanmanın hiçbir rasyonel temelinin olamayacağı yönündeki Hume’un görüşü argüman formunda yeniden yapılandırılarak ortaya konulacaktır. (shrink)

The introduction explain the need for how an international, inclusive discussion about the range of different methodological approaches from different traditions of philosophy can be read alongside each other and be seen in sometimes very critical conversation with each other. In addition, the introduction identifies four broad themes in the volume: the largest group of chapters advocate methods that promote history of philosophy as an unapologetic, autonomous enterprise with its own criteria within philosophy. Second, three chapters can be seen as (...) historicizing the history of philosophy from within. Third, four chapters argue for history of philosophy as a means toward making contributions to contemporary philosophy. Finally, two chapters explore the relationship between the history of philosophy and the history of science. (shrink)

Recent work in cognitive science of religion (CSR) is beginning to converge on a very interesting thesis—that, given the ordinary features of human minds operating in typical human environments, we are naturally disposed to believe in the existence of gods, among other religious ideas (e.g., seeAtran [2002], Barrett [2004; 2012], Bering [2011], Boyer [2001], Guthrie [1993], McCauley [2011], Pyysiäinen [2004; 2009]). In this paper, we explore whether such a discovery ultimately helps or hurts the atheist position—whether, for example, it lends (...) credence to atheism by explaining away religious belief or whether it actually strengthens some already powerful arguments against atheism in the relevant philosophical literature.We argue that the recent discoveries of CSR hurt, not help, the atheist position—that CSR, if anything, should not give atheists epistemic assurance. (shrink)

Criticism plays an essential role in the growth of scientific knowledge. In some cases, however, criticism can have detrimental effects; for example, it can be used to ‘manufacture doubt’ for the purpose of impeding public policy making on issues such as tobacco consumption and greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., Oreskes & Conway 2010). In this paper, we build on previous work by Biddle and Leuschner (2015) who argue that criticism that meets certain conditions can be epistemically detrimental. We extend and refine (...) their account by arguing that such criticism can be epistemically corrupting—it can create social conditions that are conducive to the development of epistemic vice by agents operating within them. (shrink)

Penance is often said to be a part of the process of making amends for wrongdoing. Here I clarify the nature of penance as a remedial action, highlighting the differences between it and more familiar corrective actions such as reparation and apology, and I offer an account of how penance contributes to the expiation of wrongdoing. In doing so, I reject a popular view according to which one does penance primarily by either punishing oneself or voluntarily submitting to punishment at (...) the hands of others. I contend that non‐punitive actions such gifts or acts of service are typically more conducive to achieving the reparative aims of penance. (shrink)

Leading researchers in the philosophy of mind present and explore cutting edge research in the exciting new field of experimental philosophy.

Reformed epistemology and cognitive science have remarkably converged on belief in God. Reformed epistemology holds that belief in God is basic—that is, belief in God is a natural, non-inferential belief that is immediately produced by a cognitive faculty. Cognitive science of religion also holds that belief in gods is (often) non-reflectively and instinctively produced—that is, non-inferentially and automatically produced by a cognitive faculty or system. But there are differences. In this paper, we will show some remarkable points of convergence, and (...) a few points of divergence, between Reformed epistemology and the cognitive science of religion. (shrink)

Both advocates and critics of experimental philosophy often describe it in narrow terms as being the empirical study of people’s intuitions about philosophical cases. This conception corresponds with a narrow origin story for the field—it grew out of a dissatisfaction with the uncritical use of philosophers’ own intuitions as evidence for philosophical claims. In contrast, a growing number of experimental philosophers have explicitly embraced a broad conception of the sub-discipline, which treats it as simply the use of empirical methods to (...) inform philosophical problems. And this conception has a corresponding broad origin story—the field grew out of a recognition that philosophers often make empirical claims and that empirical claims call for empirical support. In this paper, I argue that the broad conception should be accepted, offering support for the broad origin story. (shrink)

Experimental philosophy (or “x-phi”) is a way of doing philosophy. It is “traditional” philosophy, but with a little something extra: In addition to the expected philosophical arguments and engagement, x-phi involves the use of empirical methods to test the empirical claims that arise. This extra bit strikes some as a new, perhaps radical, addition to philosophical practice. We don’t think so. As this chapter will show, empirical claims have been common across the history of Western philosophy, as have appeals to (...) empirical observation in attempting to support or subvert these claims. While conceptions of philosophy have changed over time, across these changes we find philosophers employing empirical methods in pursuing their philosophical questions. Our primary aim in this chapter is to illustrate this fact. We begin by discussing the relevance of history to experimental philosophy (Section 2), then offer a necessarily condensed and highly selective history of empirical work in Western philosophy, ranging from the ancients (Section 3), to the early moderns (Section 4), to the late moderns (Section 5), and on to the present (Section 6). (shrink)

Bilimin ne olduğunun belirlenmesi ve bu bağlamda bilimin sözde bilim ya da bilimsel olmayan alanlara ilişkin sınırının nasıl çizileceği tartışması, bilim felsefesinde sınır çizme problemi olarak ele alınmaktadır. Çalışmanın ana konusunu oluşturan bu problem, özellikle yirminci yüzyıldan itibaren, bilim felsefecileri tarafından birçok ölçüt ortaya konularak çözümlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu ölçütler genellikle, bilim ile sözde bilim arasındaki sınırı belirlemek amacıyla, bilimi mantık ve mantıksal önermeler üzerinden değerlendirmektedir. Şu ana kadar Viyana Çevresi, Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos gibi filozoflarca ortaya konulan ölçütler, nihai olarak problemi (...) mantıksal açıdan ele almıştır. Sınır çizme sorununun mantıksal açıdan ya da mantıksal ifadeler aracılığıyla ele alınması demek; sorunu içeriği yerine daha çok biçimsel açıdan ele almak anlamına gelmektedir. Ayrıca, ifade, kuram, araştırma programı gibi bilim öğelerinin bilimsellik durumunu tespit edebilmek amacıyla önerilen ölçütün, tek tek gerekli ve hep birlikte yeterli olan uygun sınır çizme ölçütünü karşılaması anlamına da gelmektedir. Bu çalışma, gerek ve yeter koşul arayışının, bilimin değişken ve çeşitli yapısını tam olarak yakalayamayacağını ve bilimin belirlenmesinin ve sınırının çizilmesinin bu yöntemle mümkün olmayacağını vurgulamaktadır. Bu konunun mutlaka sosyolojik açıdan da ele alınması gerekmektedir. Bilimin sosyal yapısına, değerler sistemine de bakmamız gerekir. Sonuç olarak, sınır çizme probleminin gerek ve yeter koşulun ortaya koyduğu katı ve ortak özellikler üzerinden sonuçlandırılamayacağı, bunun yerine bilimin “aile benzerliği yaklaşımı” çerçevesinde ele alınması gerektiği vurgulanacaktır. Aile benzerliği yaklaşımının temel oluşturduğu çok boyutlu ölçüt, bu sorunun çözümünde sosyal etkenleri dâhil etmesi, bilimin çeşitliliğini kapsayabilecek ölçüde çoklu ve esnek yapıda olması ile katkıda bulunacaktır. (shrink)

The overall moral status of an option—whether it is required, permissible, forbidden, or something we really should do—is explained by competition between the contributory reasons bearing on that option and the alternatives. A familiar challenge for accounts of this competition is to explain the existence of latitude: there are usually multiple permissible options, rather than a single required option. One strategy is to appeal to distinctions between reasons that compete in different ways. Philosophers have introduced various kinds of non-requiring reasons (...) that do not generate requirements, even if they win the competition. This paper rejects two familiar versions of this strategy, one appealing to merely justifying reasons and one appealing to merely commendatory reasons. It offers a new account of how reasons compete that instead appeals to a sharp distinction between the reasons against an option and the reasons for the alternatives to that option. (shrink)

Bilimin ne olduğunun tespit edilmesi ve bilimi sözde bilimlerden ya da bilimsel olmayan alanlardan ayırt edecek ölçütün ne olması gerektiğine yönelik tartışma, bilim felsefesinde sınır çizme sorunu olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu makalede, öncelikle söz konusu soruna yönelik geleneksel yaklaşımlar incelenmiş ve ardından bu yaklaşımların bilimsel toplulukların doğasına ilişkin özellikleri göz ardı ettiği ortaya konmuştur. Daha önce yapılan çalışmalar bilimi daha çok önermeler, ifadeler ya da salt epistemik bir sistem olarak ele almakta ve bilimsel akıl yürütmenin biçimi ile bilimsel kuramların özelliklerine (...) odaklanmaktadır. Bu tespit çerçevesinde, sunulan çalışmada, bilimsel bir disiplinin asgari olarak iki özellik (yapısal ve kanıta dayalı olması) üzerine kurulması gerektiği vurgulanarak, sınır çizme sorununun çözümüne yönelik önerilen alternatif ölçüt bilimin sosyal yönüne dikkat çekmektedir. Bu bakımdan, makalenin asıl ilgisi, sınır çizme sorununu alternatif bir yolla ele alabilmek amacıyla bilimin ve onun uygulayıcılarının sosyal özelliklerine yönelik tespitleri, sözde bilimin uygulayıcıları ile kıyaslayarak aktarmaktır. Makale, bir disiplinin sözde bilim olarak nitelendirilebilmesi için öncelikle o disiplinin bilimsellik iddiasında bulunması, daha sonra bilimsel topluluk tarafından sürdürülen bir araştırma geleneğine kabul edilmemiş ya da bu araştırma geleneği tarafından terk edilmiş olması gerektiği düşüncesi ile sonuçlandırılmıştır. (shrink)

Toldot ha-meḥaber - Petaḥ davar -- Psikhonoyroʼimunologyah, yaḥase gomlin nefesh guf -- Hakarat ha-ṭov la-tseṿet ha-metapel -- Peʻilut hatsalah ha-ʻalulah le-hasev nezaḳim -- ha-Ḥoleh ha-sofani ha-noṭeh la-mut -- ʻAl saf gesher ha-ḥayim -- Ḳedushat ha-ḥayim -- Ḥoleh dimenṭi, ḥasar deʻah, Altshaimer -- Ḥolim ḳashim ʻim ekhut ḥayim yerudah u-mugbaluyot -- Refuʼat nashim (geniḳologyah), ʻubarim, yiludim ṿi-yeladim -- Bediḳot seḳer -- Amirat emet la-ḥoleh.

Le catalogue d'une exposition s'inscrivant dans la suite de Design et merveilleux (MAMC Saint-Etienne, 2018) et la Fabrique du vivant (Centre Pompidou Paris, 2019). Elle présente le lien du biomorphisme du design moderniste au biomimétisme contemporain ainsi qu'à la biofabrication et à la recréation du vivant par le design numérique.--Exhibition: Centre Pompidou-Metz, France (11.06.2022-06.02.2023).

Recent scholarship in philosophy of science and technology has shown that scientific and technological decision making are laden with values, including values of a social, political, and/or ethical character. This paper examines the role of value judgments in the design of machine-learning systems generally and in recidivism-prediction algorithms specifically. Drawing on work on inductive and epistemic risk, the paper argues that ML systems are value laden in ways similar to human decision making, because the development and design of ML systems (...) requires human decisions that involve tradeoffs that reflect values. In many cases, these decisions have significant—and, in some cases, disparate—downstream impacts on human lives. After examining an influential court decision regarding the use of proprietary recidivism-prediction algorithms in criminal sentencing, Wisconsin v. Loomis, the paper provides three recommendations for the use of ML in penal systems. (shrink)

I develop a reduction of grounding to essence. My approach is to think about the relation between grounding and essence on the model of a certain conceptof existential dependence. I extend this concept of existential dependence in a coupleof ways and argue that these extensions provide a reduction of grounding to essenceif we use sorted variables that range over facts and take it that for a fact to obtain is forit to exist. I then use the account to resolve various (...) issues surrounding the concept of grounding and its connection with essence; apply the account to paradigm cases andto the impure logic of grounding; and respond to objections. (shrink)

Bilime ve bilimsel bilgiye yönelik yaygın görüş, bilimin objektif bir faaliyet olduğudur. Bu görüş bilimsel bilginin elde edilmesinde, bilim insanlarının nesnel bir tavır sergilediğini ve onların sosyal faktörlerden etkilenmediğini varsaymaktadır. Yirminci yüzyılın ikinci çeyreğinde, Viyana Çevresi ve Karl Popper'ın düşünceleri ile bilimde sosyolojik ve psikolojik unsurların keşif bağlamı içerisinde görülebileceği, bilimsel kuramların ve araştırmaların gerekçelendirilmesine yönelik girişimlerin ise yalnızca nesnel, epistemik çalışmalardan oluştuğu ileri sürülmektedir. Keşif bağlamı ve gerekçelendirme bağlamı adı altında yapılan bu ayrıma ilişkin iddialar, Thomas Kuhn'un 1962 yılında (...) yayımlanmış olan 'Bilimsel Devrimlerin Yapısı' adlı kitabında vurguladığı argümanlar ile sekteye uğramaktadır. Kuhn, sosyal ve psikolojik etkenlerin her iki bağlamda da yer aldığını ifade etmekte ve bu sebeple keşif ve gerekçelendirme ayrımına karşı çıkmaktadır. Bu çerçevede makalede, Kuhn'un ulaşmış olduğu sonuçlar Güçlü Program'ın öne sürmüş olduğu argümanlar çerçevesinde desteklenerek ortaya konulmaktadır. -/- ABSTRACT That science is an objective activity is the common view towards science and scientific knowledge. This view assumes that scientists have an objective attitude isolated from social factors in the process of obtaining scientific knowledge. In the second quarter of the twentieth century, the Vienna Circle and Popper argued that sociological and psychological elements can be seen in the context of discovery and that attempts to justify scientific theories and research are merely objective, epistemic studies. The claims regarding this distinction made under the context of discovery and the context of justification are interrupted by the arguments emphasized by Kuhn in his "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" published in 1962. Kuhn opposes the distinction between discovery and justification by stating that social and psychological factors are present in both contexts. In this respect, Kuhn's conclusions are supported by the arguments put forward by the Strong Programme. (shrink)

Recent scholarship has considered the requirements of justice and economic regimes in the work of John Rawls. This work has not delved into the requirements of justice and liberal socialism as deeply as the work that has been done on property-owning democracy. A thorough treatment of liberal socialism and the requirements of justice is needed. This paper seeks to begin to fill this gap. In particular, it needs to be shown if liberal socialism fully answers the requirements of justice better (...) than property-owning democracy. It will be argued that liberal socialism does significantly better in realizing the two principles. This paper has the following structure, first, an overview of Rawls' position on economic regimes, capitalism, and the requirements of justice will be presented. In particular, how the two principles work in tandem to meet the demands of distributive justice will be considered. Second, a review of property-owning democracy will be conducted. Finally, liberal socialism will be examined and discussed as an economic regime that answers the requirements of justice more fully. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that absences pose a challenge to our understanding of physicalism that has not been properly appreciated. I do this by setting out a thought experiment involving a being in whom absence properties occupy the causal roles that functionalists take to define mental properties, in which case these absence properties realize the being’s mental properties. Such a being should be compatible with the truth of physicalism, I argue, even though its mental properties are neither themselves physical (...) properties nor are they realized/grounded in physical properties—instead, they are realized/grounded in (nonphysical) absence properties. I argue that the case serves as a counterexample to leading formulations of physicalism that appeal to realization or grounding, but not to standard supervenience-based formulations of physicalism, because the latter typically include negative truths in their supervenience base in addition to physical truths. I show how realization- and grounding-based formulations of physicalism might be revised to handle the problem, but also recommend that we rethink how we understand physicalism and the role that negative entities can play for physicalists. (shrink)

Because anticipated and retrospective regret play important roles in practical deliberation and motivation, better understanding them can illuminate the contours of human agency. However, the possibility of self-ignorance and the fact that we change over time can make regret—especially anticipatory regret—not only a poor predictor of where the agent will be in the future but also an unreliable indicator of where the agent stands. Granting these, this paper examines the way in which prospective and, particularly, retrospective regret can nevertheless yield (...) important insight into the sorts of creatures we are, both generally and individually. The experience of retrospective regret can show a person she values something in a way she did not know or that she is (or was) a different person than she had thought, insights which can factor into forward-looking, or prospective, deliberation. Such instances of revelatory regret reveal something to the agent about herself as agent. I examine two cases of agential self-ignorance. In the first, the experience of regret reveals what the agent values, not only to others but even to the agent himself. In the second, the agent anticipates experiencing regret for an action but does not experience the regret, suggesting that the agent did not value the rejected alternative in the way she thought. Anticipatory regret is forward-looking and can play an important role in practical deliberation. But insofar as anticipatory regret flows from one’s imperfect judgment and prospection about oneself, retrospective regret can be an important corrective in helping the agent understand her own standpoint. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the concept of collective essence: that some truths are essential to many items taken together. For example, that it is essential to conjunction and negation that they are truth-functionally complete. The concept of collective essence is one of the main innovations of recent work on the theory of essence. In a sense, this innovation is natural, since we make all sorts of plural predications. It stands to reason that there should be a distinction between essential and (...) accidental plural predications if there is a distinction among singular predications. In this paper I defend the view that the concept of collective essence is governed by the principle of Monotonicity: that something is essential to some items only if it is essential to any items to which they belong. (shrink)

Pavlovian cues predict the occurrence of motivationally salient outcomes, thus serving as an important trigger of approach and avoidance behavior. The amygdala is a key substrate of Pavlovian conditioning, and the nature of its contribution varies by the motivational valence of unconditioned stimuli. The literature on aversive Pavlovian learning supports a serial-processing model of amygdalar function, while appetitive studies suggest that Pavlovian associations are processed through parallel circuits in the amygdala. It is proposed that serial and parallel forms of information (...) processing can be attributed to differential recruitment of amygdalar nuclei, with emphasis placed on the lateral amygdala. (shrink)

This work draws an analogical defence of strong emotionism—the metaethical claim that moral properties and concepts consist in the propensity of actions to elicit emotional responses from divergent emotional perspectives. I offer a theory that is in line with that of Prinz. I build an analogy between moral properties and what I call emotion-dispositional properties. These properties are picked out by predicates such as ‘annoying’, ‘frightening’ or ‘deplorable’ and appear to be uncontroversial and frequent cases of attribution error—the attributing of (...) subjective emotional states as mind-independent properties. I present a linguistic analysis supporting the claim that moral properties and their related concepts are reducible to a subset of emotion-dispositional properties and concepts. This is grounded in the observation that utterances featuring moral predicates function linguistically and conceptually in analogous ways to emotion-dispositional predicates. It follows from this view that asserted moral utterances are truth-apt relative to ethical communities, but that speakers misconceive the extensions of predicates. I show how the framework of Cognitive Linguistics allows us to explain this error. Further analysis of moral and non-moral utterances exposes the deeper conceptual schemas structuring language through cognitive construal processes. An understanding of these processes, coupled with an emotionist elucidation of moral properties and concepts, makes the attribution error an expected upshot of the emotionist thesis, rather than an uncomfortable consequence. (shrink)

In this chapter, I explicate several general views and arguments that bear on the notion and contemporary theories of human welfare, as found in two foundational Daoist texts, the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. Ideas drawn from the Daodejing include its objections to desire theories of human welfare and its distinction between natural and acquired desires. Insights drawn from the Zhuangzi include its arguments against the view that death is bad for the dead, its attempt to develop a workable theory of (...) well-being for those who are skeptical about such theories, and the prudential benefits of what I call "philosophical double-vision.". (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to address the neglected but important problem of differentiating between epistemically beneficial and epistemically detrimental dissent. By “dissent,” we refer to the act of objecting to a particular conclusion, especially one that is widely held. While dissent in science can clearly be beneficial, there might be some instances of dissent that not only fail to contribute to scientific progress, but actually impede it. Potential examples of this include the tobacco industry’s funding of studies that (...) questioned the link between smoking and lung cancer, and the attempt by the petroleum industry and other groups to cast doubt upon the conclusion that human consumption of fossil fuels contributes to global climate change. The problem of distinguishing between good and bad dissent is important because of the growing tendency of some stakeholders to attempt to delay political action by ’manufacturing doubt’. Our discussion in this paper focuses on climate science. This field, in our view, is rife with instances of bad dissent. On the basis of our discussion of climate science, we articulate a set of sufficient conditions for epistemically problematic dissent in general, which we call “the inductive risk account of epistemically detrimental dissent.”. (shrink)